By using data on 137 counties in north China, we find that the density of financial institutions (Qianzhuang and Diandang) in the late Qing period has a significant positive effect on the number and total assets of small loan companies, a dominant institution of informal finance today. The persistent effect of historical financial institutions can be explained by Confucian culture, which instills integrity, lineage solidarity and acquaintance networks.
Convergence forces suggest that China’s per capita GDP growth rate will decline gradually from around 7% per year to the world’s historical average of 2%. In the past, this convergence tendency was more than offset by China’s opening to markets, improved legal institutions and business regulations, increased investment rates, higher life expectancy, and reduced fertility—but the convergence force will ultimately dominate.
It’s not just about jobs. It’s also about love, status, and the marriage market.
We study household financial choices in China and compare them with those in the US. We estimate a structural model where the two countries differ in terms of preferences and institutional arrangements. In the structural estimation, we take into account the effects of important structural changes in the Chinese economy between 1990-2000.
The Chinese government has occasionally suspended IPOs, exogenously creating uncertainty about access to public markets for firms already approved to list. We show that suspension-induced delay reduces corporate innovation activity both during the delay and for years after listing.