We document public-sector window dressing behavior in China’s Compulsory Education Promotion Program during the 1990s. Window-dressing behavior has been well-documented in various organizations when an agent faces high-stakes incentives.
The development of finance driven by Chinese local governments exacerbates the problem of resource misallocation, whereas market-driven finance significantly improves allocative efficiency. This highlights the policy implication that modern finance in China should prioritize the efficient utilization of resources rather than mere expansion in scale.
To improve capital allocative efficiency, starting in 2010, Chinese regulators switched from using return on equity to economic value added (EVA).
Confirming Chinese equity market is policy-driven, this study reveals a significant pre-Govt return before top government meetings, akin to the US pre-FOMC drift. It highlights the market's anticipation of these events and their impact on asset pricing, underscoring the centralized financial system in China.
China's deleveraging policies have inadvertently exacerbated the financial liquidity pressure on non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE) contractors, revealing the potential adverse impact of government fiscal consolidation on private enterprises.